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SUMMARY. Almost all commentators acknowledge that among the grounds on which 
scientists perform theory-choices are criteria of  simplicity. In general, simplicity is regarded 
either as only a logico-empirical quality of a theory, diagnostic of the theory's future predictive 
success, or as a purely aesthetic or otherwise extra-empirical property of it. This paper attempts 
to demonstrate that the simplicity-criteria applied in scientific practice include both a logico- 
empirical and a quasi-aesthetic criterion: to conflate these in an account of scientists' theory- 
choice is to court confusion. 
Key words: empirical and extra-empirical evaluative criteria, parsimony, scientific theories, 
simplicity, theory-assessment and theory-choice. 
1. THE QUALITIES OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 
Among the tasks tackled by the philosophy of science is that of under- 
standing the criteria by which scientists come to prefer a theory to its 
competitors. 
Scientists are said to choose theories which will attain the greatest empirical 
success. In principle, a theory demonstrates empirical success by according 
with empirical evidence gathered from disparate sources over unlimited 
times. Scientists needing to choose between alternative theories do not have 
such leisure, however, and require criteria able to indicate now whether 
a theory is likely to show empirical success in the future. By analyzing 
what is meant by empirical success, or by recalling what features were 
displayed by past theories which scored notable successes of the desired 
kind, scientists draw up a list of features which appear to be diagnostic 
of such attainments. The features of theories which are taken as diagnostic 
of their future empirical success will here be termed their 'logico-empirical' 
properties; they are such qualities as, in W. H. Newton-Smith's formulation, 
observational nesting, fertility, a good track record, strong intra-theory 
support, and internal consistency. 1 Scientific communities seek out and 
prefer theories which display these logico-empirical features, in the expec- 
tation that they will be likelier than other theories to succeed in empirical 
tests. 
A scientist may portray his or her choices among theories as guided 
by no criteria other than logico-empirical ones: however, the philosopher 
who aims to account for scientists' actual preferences as these are recorded 
in the history of science will perceive the influence of a further set of criteria. 
It is shown for instance by G. Buchdahl that 'although falsifiability, con- 
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firmation, and predictive power - all involving appeals to observational 
data, however conceptualized - are important criteria for the choice and 
acceptability of hypotheses, they are not sufficient' for an accurate recon- 
struction of the history of science? Accordingly, philosophers conclude 
that scientists apply in theory-choice not only logico-empirical criteria which 
are diagnostic of theories' future empirical success, but also extra-empirical 
criteria which do not lend themselves to this diagnostic role. Such additional 
criteria of theory-assessment are frequently characterized as 'aesthetic' or 
'metaphysical'. 3 
The philosopher's reference to two canons of theory-choice, that of criteria 
diagnostic of empirical success and that of metaphysical or other extra- 
empirical criteria, creates the task of deciding to which category belongs 
any particular criterion of which the application is observed in the history 
of science. 
2. SIMPLICITY AS A LOGICO-EMPIRICAL QUALITY 
Most accounts of theory-choice acknowledge that scientists will prefer a 
theory to its competitors if, the theories appearing equally worthy on other 
grounds, the claims of the former theory are simpler than those of the 
latter? The consensus that a simplicity-criterion operates in many episodes 
of theory-choice is not matched by agreement over the nature of  this criterion, 
and more particularly over the category to which it is properly to be ascribed. 
On some accounts, the simplicity of a theory's claims is diagnostic of that 
theory's future empirical success, and the simplicity-criterion ought therefore 
to be counted among the logico-empirical evaluative criteria; other accounts 
suggest that the simplicity of a theory is wholly uncorrelated to its future 
empirical performance, and that simplicity-criteria are to be likened in this 
regard to many a metaphysical criterion of theory-evaluation? Expressions 
of the latter view will be discussed in the next section; first let us consider 
accounts of the simplicity of a theory as a criterion diagnostic of its future 
empirical success. 
There are two common arguments to the effect that, of a pair of theories 
which fit current experimental data equally well, the simpler is empiri- 
cally superior; 6 each of  these presupposes that there exist yardsticks by 
which the degree of simplicity of theories may be measured or at least 
compared. 7 
The first argument rests on the premises that the more informative of 
two hypotheses is the empirically superior, and that the simpler of a pair 
of theories is the more informative. E. Sober writes in justification of the 
first premise: 'The more informative our knowledge claims are about the 
individuals in our environment, the less we need to find out about the 
special details of any arbitrary individual before we can say what its 
properties are. '8 S. F. Barker strives to ground the second premise as fol- 
lows: 
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If one system is simpler than another [...] then the simpler one 'says more,' it has 'more 
content,' because it excludes a greater number of possible models; therefore it runs more 
risk of being contradicted by the evidence. A system which takes a risk yet survives deserves 
more credit, it earns more credibility, than does a system which survives but says less and 
thus has taken less risk. 9 
On this argument,  the simpler theory is a superior predictive tool by dint 
of being, on its own, more informative than a more complex theory would be. 
The second argument  seeks to establish that simpler theories have higher 
likelihood of being true than more complex theories which fit the expe- 
rimental findings equally well: on a Bayesian analysis, the former are 
therefore better supported by those data. 1° The notion that simpler theories 
yielding the same predictions as more complex ones derive stronger support  
from any common body of favourable evidence has been applied on several 
notable occasions in scientific practice: G. C. Williams, for instance, uses 
a principle of pars imony to argue in evolutionary biology that the theory 
of group selection and biotic adaptat ion is less well supported by the data 
than is the theory of genic selection and organic adaptation.11 
3. SIMPLICITY AS AN EXTRA-EMPIRICAL OR AESTHETIC QUALITY 
The opinion that the simplicity of a theory is diagnostic of the theory's  
future empirical success, and thus that the simplicity-criterion belongs to 
the category of logico-empirical evaluative criteria, is widespread; similarly 
popular  is however the alternative option, that of denying to the simplicity 
of a theory any correlation with its future empirical success. For  instance, 
Newton-Smith writes: 'There is no reason to see greater relative simplicity 
[...] as an indicator of greater verisimilitude' in a theory. I2 If  this is true, 
the simplicity-criterion should be allocated to the extra-empirical canon 
of theory-evaluation. Buchdahl inclines to this view in entering 'maxims 
of simplicity and economy'  alongside 'general metaphysical notions'  in the 
class of extra-empirical criteria. 13 
What  grounds suggest that simplicity-criteria cannot be diagnostic of 
the likely degree of future empirical success of  theories? It is claimed often 
that the content of simplicity-criteria is subjective, and that they therefore 
cannot be taken as a guide to the degree to which theories possess some 
objective quality, such as proximity to the truth. Two arguments might 
be envisaged for supposing that simplicity-judgements of theories are 
subjective in the way this belief requires. 
The first notes the indeterminacy of the expression ' the simpler of  two 
theories'. Suppose the following: that we have need to select a theory to 
describe a certain physical regularity; that several theories are currently 
candidates for adoption,  each of which purports  to model the regularity 
by means of a polynomial  function, and distinguishes itself f rom the other 
theories only in proposing a different polynomial  to this end; and that 
all these theories accord equally well with the data now available, so we 
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propose to choose ' the simplest' among them. There are, R. Harr+ points 
out, (at least) three different simplicity-criteria in terms of which we could 
interpret this policy: 
(a) the criterion of integral numbers, upon which we would prefer a 
polynomial containing only integral powers to one containing fractional 
powers; 
(b) the criterion of the lowest power, according to which we should choose 
the polynomial  having the lowest degree; 
(c) the criterion of the reduction of observables, in accordance with which 
we should choose the function containing the smallest number  of  inde- 
pendent variables.14 
The injunction to choose the theory incorporating ' the simplest relation' 
offers no guidance on which of these criteria is to be applied: each of 
these kinds of  simplicity is of arguably equal privilege. In view of this 
proliferation of kinds of simplicity, the decision over which of two theories 
is the simpler can be subjective only: judgements of simplicity, the argument 
concluders, cannot  therefore constitute logico-empirical criteria of theory- 
choice. 15 
The second argument aiming to demonstrate the subjectivity of simplicity- 
judgements hangs on an interpretation of what is actually meant by the 
statement that a theory is simple. Hart6 suggests that, at least frequently, 
such a statement means no more than that the theory appears pleasingly 
familiar to those acquainted with it: 
In many cases when a theory is judged to be simple attention is not being drawn to the 
paucity of concepts employed in its construction or to the simplicity of its structure but 
to the fact that the model which it is based upon is one which either the author of the 
theory or preferably everyone, is quite familiar.~6 
Thus the billiard-ball model of  gases might appear  simple to a classical 
physicist, because of the familiarity of this model to anyone versed in 
Newtonian mechanics. The degree of familiarity which a community  has 
with a theory is clearly a characteristic of the current stage in the history 
of the community 's  science, and is to this extent subjective. If  indeed the 
judgement that a theory is simple expresses no more than its current 
familiarity, judgements of simplicity cannot be expected to indicate which 
of two theories is ceteris paribus closer to the truth. 
Many of the authors who deny to the simplicity of a theory a correlation 
with the theory's  future empirical success go on to characterize it as an 
aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic property of  the theory. H. Margenau writes 
of  the requirement that a theory should display a property of 'simplicity 
and elegance', for instance. 17 The assimilation of simplicity to an aesthetic 
property of the theory is performed not only by observers of scientific 
methodology but also frequently by its practitioners. Einstein for one appears 
to have believed that, in the words of  Y. Elkana, 'simplicity was equivalent 
to beauty '  in theory-choice. 18 On this view, the decision to adopt one theory 
SIMPLICITY OF THEORIES 5 
in preference to another in virtue of the simplicity which they exhibit is 
reached on criteria of aesthetic taste. 19 
4. THE CONSISTENCY OF THE TWO ACCOUNTS 
Philosophers of science are presented with the option of conceiving of 
simplicity-criteria as logico-empirical, and that of  understanding them as 
extra-empirical, quasi-aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment. They appear  
for the most part  to regard these options as exclusive alternatives; they 
seem unwilling to conclude that both conceptions can be accommodated 
in a richer account of what it is for a theory to be simple. 2° Almost alone, 
H. Reichenbach admits that scientists apply both empirical and aesthetic 
criteria of  simplicity, but even he circumscribes the utility of the aesthetic 
criterion to the choice between more and less convenient expressions of  
logically-equivalent theories, a conception which sorely limits the influence 
of an aesthetic criterion of simplicity in theory-choice. 21 
Philosophers'  belief that these alternatives are incompatible feeds into 
their reconstructions of scientists' acts of theory-evaluation. For instance, 
D.J. Hil lman portrays the scientific community as divided into two camps, 
one regarding simplicity as nothing but a logico-empirical criterion and 
the other applying it in purely aesthetic judgements: 
It is likely that [some scientists] will choose the simpler theory as better supported by the 
evidence, even though both theories are equally compatible with the evidence in their favor. 
[...] Other practitioners, however, feel that the notion of simplicity cannot be helpfully 
characterized. Simplicity is, in their opinion, much too heavily dependent on aesthetic and 
pragmatic considerations to be genuinely analyzable. = 
The reason for which the two accounts are believed to be mutually 
exclusive is, I think, that the arguments reported in section 2 seem on 
current interpretations to militate against the thesis that any evaluation 
of the simplicity of  theories can be ascribed to aesthetic judgement,  and 
that the arguments cited in section 3 are seen as weighing against the 
proposit ion that any simplicity-criteria can be a guide to empirical worth. 
After all, one might reason, if the degree of a theory's  simplicity is diagnostic 
of its future empirical success, one would not want to consider judgements 
of its simplicity as anything other than logico-empirical evaluations; and 
if the appraisal of  a theory's  simplicity is purely subjective, one would 
not want to consider its outcome as in any way reflecting the theory's 
empirical worth. 
This paper  will offer an interpretation of simplicity-criteria in scientific 
practice which, on the contrary, allows one to hold both beliefs about  
the simplicity of  theories, namely that (a) the degree of simplicity of  a 
theory is a logico-empirical quality of  it, diagnostic of its future empirical 
success, and that (b) evaluations of  theories in the matter  of their simplicity 
cannot be expected, in other respects, to show a systematic correlation 
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with the degree of the theories' empirical success. The next section will 
offer no arguments for either (a) or (b) on its own to add to those already 
reported in sections 2 and 3 respectively, but will concentrate instead on 
demonstrating the cogency of holding both conclusions within the new 
account of simplicity-criteria in science. 
5. DEGREES AND FORMS OF SIMPLICITY 
Suppose that a theory's simplicity can be completely described by specifying 
the values of some parameters. The question to be tackled in the latter 
part of this section is, how many independent parameters of this kind must 
be consulted in the task of ranking uniquely a number of given theories 
according to their simplicity? By way of an approach to this problem, the 
question which will initially be considered in this section is, what parameters 
must one fix in order to give an exhaustive description of the simplicity 
of a given theory? 
Specification of the degree of the simplicity of a theory fails on its own 
to constitute an exhaustive description of the simplicity of that theory. 
As evidence for this, consider the following possibilities. Physical theories 
may be simple, as the Newtonians wished them to be, in adducing the 
same explanatory schemas for a wide range of phenomena; z3 they may 
be simple, as E. Mach wished them to be, in appealing to a small number 
of different material entities; 24 yet again, they may be simple, as Einstein 
wished them to be, in resting upon an economical set of independent 
theoretical postulates. 25 
Let us express the fact that theories are simple in different ways, such 
as these, by the statement that they exhibit different forms of  simplicity. 
A theory will in general exhibit more than one form of  simplicity; but 
the degree to which a theory displays one form is uncorrelated with the 
degree to which it possesses another. A theory may achieve a certain degree 
of simplicity in reducing a given range of phenomena to a common expla- 
natory schema, attain some other degree in respect of the breadth of the 
ontological domain to which it appeals, and exhibit yet a third degree of 
simplicity in the intricacy of the postulates upon which it rests. 
We should certainly say that each of these achievements is a component 
of the theory's simplicity, which ought to be captured by a full description 
of the simplicity of the theory. Thus, a complete characterization of the 
simplicity of a theory would consist of a specification of the degree to 
which the theory exhibits each of the forms of simplicity which may be 
envisaged in a theory. In other terms, an exhaustive description of the 
simplicity of  a theory- consists of a record of the degree to which the theory 
exhibits ontological parsimony, the degree to which it exhibits moderation 
in the appeal to independent theoretical postulates, and so on through 
the forms of simplicity which theories can conceivably show. 
This answers the preliminary question of this section. Now let us pass 
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from considering the problem of assembling a complete description of the 
simplicity which a theory possesses to the problem of determining the number 
of parameters which one must fix in order to construct a unique evaluative 
ranking of some theories according to their simplicity. 
A specification of the simplicity which one would wish to see exhibited 
by theories in a certain domain of science need not, of course, be as extensive 
as a complete description of the simplicity actually exhibited by a theory. 
Whilst the latter codification must specify the degree to which the theory 
exhibits each of the forms of simplicity which theories may be envisaged 
to possess, the former codification need indicate only a limited number 
of forms of simplicity, viz., those forms to which one has resolved to accord 
particular value in theory-assessment. In fact, a canon of criteria of theory- 
evaluation will typically make mention - as did e.g. the canons of Mach 
or of Einstein - of a single form of simplicity which the creator of . the 
canon favours. 
Even if its breadth is thus reduced, a specification of the simplicity which 
a scientist wishes to see embodied in theories must stipulate the values 
of two independent parameters: the form of the simplicity that theories 
ought to embody, and the degree to which they are to embody simplicity 
of that form. This means that a canon of theory-evaluation must typically 
include two simplicity-related criteria, a criterion of form and one of degree 
of simplicity. The canon could specify, for instance, that theories of the 
cosmos should display simplicity in the variety of material elements to 
which they appeal (rather than, say, in the values of the numerical ratios 
which they cite), and that they should display this simplicity to the degree 
of appealing to four or fewer material elements (rather than to five or 
more). Then, given a range of theories exhibiting diverse forms of simplicity 
to varying degrees, the scientist equipped with a canon of theory-evaluation 
will select the theory of which the simplicity best accords to his or her 
requirements in form and in degree. (It may well be that, whatever form 
of simplicity they individually pick, many scientists will say that they would 
like to see a theory exhibit this form to the highest possible degree: but 
this is no less a specification of the degree to which they would like theories 
to possess simplicity.) 
If a canon of theory-evaluation contains anything less than a specification 
of both the form of simplicity which theories ought to display and the 
degree to which they should display that form of simplicity, it will be unable 
in general to rank theories uniquely in the matter of their simplicity. On 
the one hand, a canon which contains only a criterion of form of simplicity 
- i.e. which limits itself to prescribing that theories ought to display 
ontological parsimony, say - will be unable to discriminate between theories 
which display this form of simplicity to different degrees. (Arguably, of 
course, any theory could be said to display ontological parsimony to some 
degree or other.) On the other hand, the criterion of degree of simplicity 
does not in general deliver a unique verdict in an instance of theory-choice 
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if a desired form of simplicity has not also been specified. The reason 
for this is the following. Without a ranking of forms of simplicity having 
been agreed, the advocate of  any theory is in general able legitimately to 
claim that his or her theory is the simplest of those available, on the grounds 
that it exhibits some form of simplicity or other to a degree greater than 
do its competitors; thus, under such conditions, it is in general impossible 
univocally to judge which among a number of alternative theories is the 
simplest. 26 
Consider for instance the task of choosing on the grounds of simplicity 
between the Copernican and Keplerian theories of the solar system. The  
Copernican theory may legitimately be considered the simpler in making 
reference to only circles rather than ellipses, in view of the fact that the 
specification of a circle requires half as many parameters  as does that of 
an ellipse; on the other hand, the Keplerian theory is arguably the simpler 
in needing recourse to a smaller number of  such figures to account for 
the trajectory of a given planet to the degree of accuracy attained by the 
Copernican theory. In this case, as in general, the precept to choose the 
simpler theory yields a determinate outcome only after a stipulation of  
the form of simplicity to which preference is to be attached. 
While no scientist was probably ever in need to adjudicate between the sim- 
plicity of Copernicus's theory and that of  Kepler's, there are many docu- 
mented episodes in which the outcome of obeying the precept to choose the 
theory of higher degree of simplicity of a pair would have been indeterminate 
in the absence of a stipulation of which of the forms of simplicity exhibited 
by the two was to be held preferable. Here are two examples. 
As G. Hol ton recounts, 'Einstein and Planck debated strongly in 1914 
whether the simplest physics is one that regards as basic accelerated motion 
(as Einstein had come to believe) or unaccelerated motion (as Planck 
insisted). '27 While this difference of opinion persisted, even if Einstein and 
Planck had each wished to heed the injunction of choosing the theory which 
they regarded as the simpler, they would still have failed to adopt  the 
same theory. The consensus, subsequently established, that the concept of 
accelerated motion is the more basic ensures that Einstein's opinion is now 
deemed superior to that of Planck on criteria of simplicity. 
In the absence of a preference for a particular form of simplicity, the 
choice on simplicity-criteria between Einstein's and Newton's  laws of 
gravitation would similarly be indeterminate. As R A. M. Dirac writes: 
One of the fundamental laws of motion is the law of gravitation which, according to Newton, 
is represented by a very simple equation, but, according to Einstein, needs the development 
of an elaborate technique before its equation can even be written down. [...] From the standpoint 
of higher mathematics, one can give reasons in favour of the view that Einstein's law of 
gravitation is actually simpler than Newton's. 28 
A physicist minded to choose the theory of which the equations took the 
simplest form would be drawn to Newtonianism, while one who aimed 
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at the greatest simplicity of the overall theoretical structure would find 
Einstein's superior. 29 
6. THE NATURES OF THE TWO SIMPLICITY-CRITERIA 
The previous section suggested that, concealed in generic talk of 'preferring 
simpler theories', there are in fact two simplicity-criteria employed in the 
evaluation of scientific theories: the criterion of the degree of simplicity 
of a theory, and the criterion of the form of the theory's simplicity. There 
is now therefore no longer the problem of determining to which category 
of evaluative criteria belongs 'the simplicity-criterion'. Rather, there is now 
the problem of determining the natures of the two criteria separately: whether 
each of them is a logico-empirical criterion in the sense outlined in section 
2, or an extra-empirical and arguably aesthetic criterion as suggested by 
the arguments reported in section 3. 
I am persuaded (for whatever this declaration is worth) by the arguments 
of the kind retraced in section 2 that, if one has on separate grounds bestowed 
privilege to a certain form of simplicity, and one is presented with a pair 
of theories each of which can be taken to exhibit that form of simplicity 
and which accord equally well with the currently available data, the theory 
exhibiting the specified form of simplicity to the greater degree is preferable 
qua empirically superior t o  the other. If this is true, the criterion of the 
degree of simplicity is a logico-empirical criterion of theory-evaluation in 
the sense enshrined in section 2. 
What of the nature of the criterion of form of simplicity? I think there 
are two ways by which to attempt to demonstrate that it too is a logico- 
empirical criterion. 
One way is to find some systematic argument which establishes a corre- 
lation between a theory's possession of a certain form of simplicity and, 
say, its probable degree of future empirical success: it may be that some 
a priori reason could be discerned for believing that theories which exhibit 
certain forms of simplicity are celeris paribus more likely to be true than 
theories which do not. Faith in this project might descend, for instance, 
from the assumption that the natural world itself attributes privilege to 
a certain form of simplicity. But the prospects of finding such an argument 
seem dim. While principles of statistics may suggest that a simpler theory 
is ceteris paribus more likely to demonstrate empirical success than a less 
simple theory, they give no indication of the form or forms of simplicity 
apt to maximize this likelihood. The logic of inference appears to have 
no grounds upon which to tell whether a theory which exhibits e.g. onto- 
logical parsimony is ceteris paribus more or less likely to demonstrate 
empirical success than a theory which exhibits moderation in the number 
of theoretical postulates to which it appeals. 
The second way by which one might show that a theory's possession 
of a certain form of simplicity is correlated with greater empirical success relies 
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on a meta-inductive procedure.  One could cast an inductive eye over the his- 
tory of  science and determine whether theories demonst ra t ing certain forms 
of  simplicity had as a matter  of  contingent  fact tended to be closer to the 
t ruth - as this was later revealed - than other theories. This is the procedure  
advocated by Newton-Smith  in his survey of  the ' factors [...] which can 
serve as fallible indicators of  likely long-term observational  success': 
The grounds for including any particular factor will be meta-inductive. If we can locate factors 
that have guided scientists in making theory choices which turned out to be correct on the 
ultimate test, we shall have inductive grounds for operating within the constraints of these 
particular inductive f a c t o r s .  3° 
If  such correlations were unearthed for a part icular  form of simplicity, 
one would  have meta-inductive grounds for believing that theories exhibiting 
simplicity of  that  fo rm were ceteris 1)aribus empirically superior to other  
theories. 
This is an empirical project  in the his tor iography of  science; to the extent 
to which the nature of  the criterion of  form of  simplicity will be revealed 
by this approach,  it is an as yet unat ta ined item of  empirical information.  
On the one hand,  one can easily conceive o f  evidence being discerned that, 
say, theories chosen on the criterion of  ontological  pars imony have in history 
tended to be revealed closer to the t ruth than theories adopted  on the 
criterion of  economy of  theoretical postulates. This evidence would be o f  
the kind apt  to suppor t  the judgement  that the criterion of  form of  simplicity 
is a logico-empirical criterion. On the other hand, however,  the historical 
record on the face of  it shows no correlat ion of  the required kind between 
part icular  forms of  simplicity and later empirical success. I f  the intuition 
that these correlations do not exist is borne out,  it would seem that 
judgements  of  the form of  theories '  simplicity are extra-empirical. 
In summary,  this article finds that  an exhaustive assessment of  a theory 
on the grounds of  its simplicity requires two independent  evaluations to be 
made. The way in which scientists choose among  theories in virtue o f  their 
simplicity cannot  be unders tood unless the difference between these two 
simplicity-criteria is appreciated. If  the hunches explored at the end of  this 
paper  are accurate,  it is justified on logico-empirical grounds  to choose 
for  adopt ion  f rom a m o n g  a set o f  theories exhibiting a certain form of  sim- 
plicity the theory which exhibits that  form of  simplicity to the highest degree; 
but the pr ior  decision of  which form or forms of  simplicity one should like 
to see embodied in theories must  be taken on grounds other  than logico- 
empirical. It is at least arguable that such choices may be made,  or  have 
commonly  in the history of  science been made,  on  criteria of  aesthetic tas te)  1 
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~8 Elkana (1982), p. 222. Similarly, Wilson (1978, p. 11) considers the simplicity of  a 
generalization to be an important  component  of  its elegance or beauty. Scientists conversely 
regard unwarranted complexity as a kind of ugliness in a theory: Shanmugadhasan  (1987, 
p. 53) writes that in 1945 Dirac 'emphasized that he did not believe his quan tum electrodynamics 
was the right theory because it was so complicated and ugly. '  
~9 Some further remarks on the aesthetic aspects of  simplicity-criteria may be found in 
McAllister (1989), pp. 31-2. 
2o For instance, Feuer (1957, pp. 115-7) and Sober (1984, p. 238, note 16) deny that the 
appraisal of  a theory's simplicity can possess an aesthetic aspect as well as holding clues 
to the likely future empirical success of  the theory. 
2L Reichenbach (1938), pp. 373-5. 
22 Hil lman (1962), pp. 225-6. 
23 On simplicity-principles in Newton's  work see Sober (1988), pp. 51-5. 
~-4 The requirement of ontological pars imony was prompted by Mach's  view of science: 'Sci- 
ence [...] may be regarded as a minimal problem, consisting of the completest possible pre- 
sentment of  facts with the least possible expenditure of thought' (1883, p. 586; emphasis  as 
12 JAMES W. McALLISTER 
in the original). Mach's criterion of simplicity is discussed in Ray (t987), pp. 1-50. 
25 Commenting upon a discrepancy of up to ten per cent between the measured value of 
a gravitational deviation of  a light-ray and the magnitude of  the effect calculated from general 
relativity, Einstein weighed structural simplicity against any empirical deficiency of the theory: 
'This thing is not particularly important, because the main significance of the theory does 
not lie in the verification of  little effects, but rather in the great simplification of the theoretical 
basis of physics as a whole' (cited in Holton 1973, p. 236). The details of Einstein's view 
of theory-evaluation are set out chiefly in his (1949), pp. 21-33. Further discussion of  Einstein's 
appeal to simplicity-criteria is offered in Hesse (1974), pp. 239-55, or Elkana (1982); on this 
topic see also Williamson (1977). 
26 Lakatos (1971, p. 131, note 106; emphasis as in the original) espouses this claim too: 
'Simplicity can always be defined for any pair of theories TI and T 2 in such a way that 
the simplicity of T~ is greater than that of T>' 
27 Holton (1978), p. 299, note 8; emphasis in the original. 
28 Dirac (1939), p. 123. Dirac comments ibid. that holding the view that Einstein's theory 
is simpler than Newton's 'involves assigning a rather subtle meaning to simplicity.' 
~9 One can imagine many other cases in which a theory which looks complex on one criterion 
can be interpreted as simple on another, however apparently outrageous the effect of applying 
this second criterion. A cartoon by J. Cartier, reproduced in Gelf-Mann (1988), p. 137, depicts 
a lecturer stating: 'At this point we notice that this equation is beautifully simplified if we 
assume that space-time has 92 dimensions.' If the lecturer's audience paused to ask whether 
our theories should aim for the simplest equations or for the least number of dimensions 
attributed to space-time, they would be appealing to criteria of form of simplicity. 
3o Newton-Smith (1981), pp. 224-5. 
3~ A rough version of this paper was delivered in August 1989 at a seminar at the Faculty 
of Philosophy, University of Leiden. I am grateful to the participants for their criticism and 
other comments. 
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